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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
~I 0 LLE H r I> \ ~ l \ i\ L I XES, 
u. eorporation, and 
Lllll~RTY :\IUTUl\L lXRURANCE 
(.'()~I P .A\ Y, a corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
TilE I~Dl"~rrHil\L COl\f~IISSION 
OF l~T.\11, TY\~EX .:\1)1\~lH, 
\r .\~.\ T,CH CONHTRUCTION 
(.'()~IP . \~-y and THE STATE 
~~~l"H.\XCE F,l;XD, 
DrfPJldaJlts. 
X;\TlTRE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
10101 
Thi~ i~ an app~al fro1n an order awarding injury 
hPn~fit~ under th~ ,, ... orkn1en ·~ Co1npensation Act . 
. A.n order ,,-a~ entered by The Industrial Commission 
for the applicant and against Plaintiffs Mollerup \ ... an 
Line~ and Liberty ~Iutual Insurance Co1npany and 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
dismissing the action against defendants Wasatch Con-
struction Company and the State Insurance Fund, and 
after an application for rehearing \\~as denied, thi~ 
appeal followed. 
RELIEF SOl~GHT OX APPEAL 
Plaintiffs l\I ollerup \7" an Lines and Liberty l\1 utnal 
Insurance Company, herein called ~~ ollflrup and Liberty, 
seek reversal of the order as a matter of la\\T and dis-
missal of the action against them. 
STATEl\fENT OF FACTS 
The applicant, Tyven Adams, suffered an industrial 
accident on April 8, 1958, during his employment \rith 
~follerup. ( R-72). While attempting to lift a truck 
\\TlH_}Pl onto its axle (R-32), he slipped and something 
"popped" in his back, causing hin1 to fall to the ground 
(R-32, 33). Little or no \\Tor king time \vas lost as a result, 
but chiropractic treatlnents \Vere authorized by the 
Indus trial Co1nmission ( R-:23, 69). Applicant's back 
continued to trouble hiu1 some\vhat, but did not prPvent 
his working (ll-~-t~) or oth(_lr norrnal activities (R-24). 
Based upon this accident, application for a hearing 
entitled: "Tyven Adan1s, Applicant, v. Liberty ~Iutual, 
Defendant, Clai1n .K o. l.J[ 140-99~' \\Tas made by the 
applicant to the Industrial l~onunission on July 13, 1960 
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( H-68). rrhe ('H~P \\·a~ referred to a ~r edical Advisory 
nllt\l'd, \rhieh PXH.lllined the applicant On January 28, 
t ~)f) t ( H-;);q and upon its findings the Co1nmission 
ordPrt'd a hunp su1n paytnPnt of $37 4.50 to the applicant 
hY LihPrtv as insurPr of ~[ollerup, as co1npensation for 
. . ' 
n "IH'rtiutnent disability amounting to 5% loss of bodily 
function .. (R-;>~). "·hich a1nount was paid on February 
:~. 19(il. and H<'<'Ppted hy the applicant. 
rrhereafter, on February 26, 1963, the applicant 
sought a hParing upon an application entitled HTyven 
.\datu~ •• \pplicant, v. The State Insurance Fund, Defend-
ant. ( ~laitn No. ()()(i-t,'' based on a claimed industrial 
a<·eident of Oetober '27, 1962 while employed by Wasatch 
Con~trurtion Con1pany (R-4). The applicant had been 
~tanding on the tongue of some heavy construction 
Pquiptnent, pulling on a cable, when the cable suddenly 
crune loo~<'. The applicant lost his balance and stepped 
back off the equip1nent into a hole, causing a "kink" 
in hi~ back (R-15 ). The applicant continued to work at 
n lt\~~ ~trenuous rate (R-19) until X ove1nber 28, 1962, 
at \vhich titnt\ lu~ '"n~ ter1ninated because of a cut in force 
nnd ha~ not \\"or ked since ( R-:29). 
The applicant had also sustained a back injury in 
Jnnt'. 19(i0, "·hile en1ployPd by ~lick Iverson's Service 
~tation a~ he "·as lifting a battery out from under the 
hood of a car (R.-115). He suffered an immediate pain in 
hi:' back for \Yhich he sought chiropractic treatment and 
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4 
which subsequently forced him to seek lighter \Vork 
(R-25). 
On April 15, 1963, the hearing on Claim No. 606-t 
was held with the applicant present and the defendants 
Wasatch Construction Company and The State Insur-
ance Fund l'l'lH'e~t>nb:cl (R-11). Tht• Referee, upon 
discovery of the applicant's prior back injuries while 
e1nployed by ~lollerup and :ThJick 1 v(·rson, referred the 
matter to a 1\led.ical Advisory Panel, \Yhich exa1nined 
the applicant and reported by letter on July 26, 1963, 
its conclusion that the applicant's Hpresent condition 
reprPsents a continuation of the injury of April 8, 195S, 
and the subsequent minor accidents have not been 
sigificant in the overall progress of his condition sincP 
that injury" ( R-79). 
J\Iollerup and Liberty W'ere added as parties 
defendant to the applicanfs Claim No. 6064 by order 
of the Co1nmission dated ~epte1nber 3, 1963 (R-8±), 
and another hearing on Clairn .:\ o. 6064 "·as held 
~~ ove1nher 13, 1963, at \\·hich tin1e the ~ledical Panel 
Chairrnan, Dr. l~oyd Holbrook, and the applicant "·pre 
exarnined (R-89). lTpon eross-exarnination, Dr. Holbrook 
conceded that the applicant suffered fron1 pre-existing 
progrPssivP degPn(•rativP ehang<'s in his back prior to 
the 1~)38 accident ( 1~-103), that the applicant's condition 
\\'as aggravated h)~ Parh of the three subsequent accidents 
(R-105 ), and that it \\·as difficult to say ,,·hich of the 
accidents had greatPr "'pushing do\\Tn ,, pffect (R-106). 
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5 
l~y ordPr of thP (~on1mission dated January 8, 19'64, 
thP dPt'l\ndants '\""asatch Construction Company and 
The ~tatP Jnsurance Fund were dismissed from the 
procPPdings and l\follerup and Liberty were directed to 
pay the applicant ··temporary total disability from 
J anuar~p 1, 1963 until the applicant is released by his 
nttendi ng physician" and they were further ordered 
to ""proffer to the applicant the needed surgical treat-
tnPnf' (R-131). 
A petition for rehearing was filed by ~Iollerup and 
Liberty "·ithin the time provided by law. The petition 
wns denied February 6, 1964 (R-139). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COMMISSION DID NOT INVOKE, NOR COULD 
IT HAVE INVOKED, ITS STATUTORY POWER OF CON-
TI:\UING JURISDICTION OF THE APPLICANT'S PRIOR 
CLAI~I AGAINST THE PLAINTIFFS. 
The Conunission hearing of November 13, 1963 was 
ha~t\d upon the applicant's Claim No. 6064 against 
\ra~atch Construction Company and was not a continued 
litigation of the prior Claim No. I~I 1±0-99, which had 
alrPady been filed, settled, and closed. The record 
reveals the Conunission's intent "\vhen Commissioner 
\Vie~ ley \\·a~ confronted ""ith this question: 
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"Mr. Snow: .... Now I don't think that is 
the la\v, and I see no basis for a reopening here. 
If that is what this is, although I confess I am 
not sure it is an attempt to reopen. 
"Referee: It isn't a reopening. It's a further 
hearing." 
The Utah Workmen's Compensation Act, Section 
35-1-78, U.C.A., 1953, allows a reopening of a previously 
settled and concluded claim. It reads: 
"The powers and jurisdiction of the commis-
sion over each case shall be continuing, and it 
may from time to time make such modification 
or change with respect to former findings, or 
orders with respect thereto, as in its opinion may 
be justified, provided, however, that records 
pertaining to cases, other than those of total 
permanent disability or \Yhere a claim has been 
filed as in 35-1-99, '"·hich have been closed and 
inactive for a period of 10 years, may be de-
stroyed at the discretion of the co1nmission." 
The Commissioner understood the pow·er to invoke 
this jurisdictional section of this statute and noted thP 
established procedure for doing so, but he expressly 
denied that Claim No. IM 140-99 "Tas under consideration. 
HMr. Sno\\,.: 
But "Then the Connnission follo\vs out the :Jled-
iral Advisory Board by sending us notice of 
\vhat the deter1nination is, and "That should be 
paid, and ",.e pay it and the file is closed, that 
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constitut(ls, it seems to 1ne, at the very least 
an acceptanee by all parties, and a ratifica-
tion of a non-statutory medical advisory board 
finding. 
••Referee: 
Yes. Now if an application was on file within 
the three-year limit, then the applicant could 
reopen that by filing an application for fur-
thPr and additional compensation, because of 
the continuing jurisdiction section of the stat-
ute. Which I can't consider this procedure as 
an application for further and additional com-
pensation under that case. 
··~rr. Snow: 
I can't see how you could either. I agree. 
That is 'Yhy I a1n 'vondering 'vhat I am doing 
here." (R-128.> 
It is obvious from the above recital that in order 
for Claim I~l 140-99 to be reopened the applicant must 
file "an application for further and additional compen-
sation·· against the Plaintiffs and such was never 
arcotnplishPd in the instant case. 
By reference to not having "issued any order'' to 
reopen Claiiu I~I 140-99, the Commissioner concedes the 
legal necessity of issuing some notice to the Plaintiffs 
that the Commission is reopening the formerly settled 
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claim. Such a require1nent is discussed by this Court in 
Spring Canyon Coal Co., et al. v. Industrial Commissiou 
of Utah, 60 lT tah 533, :210 P. 611 ( 1922). After quoting 
the Code section on continuing jurisdiction, this Court 
said at page 614: 
''It is perhaps unnecessary to state that in 
order to invoke the jurisdiction of the Commis-
sion, under the section just quoted, due notice 
should be given to necessary parties, \vhich notice 
should state the objective of the proceedings, 
together \vith the nature and rharactPr of the 
relief sought." 
The record sho\vs that such notice "ras never issued 
to the Plaintiffs. Thus the hearing of November 13, 
1963 was solely based upon the ne\\T Claim, X o. 6064, and 
Plaintiffs \Vert> brought into that clai1n as defendants 
to the ne\\'" action against \Y. asatch Construction Com-
pany-. 
Had there been an atten1pt to invoke the continuing 
jurisdiction of the Connnission as to Clai1n X o. Il\1 140-99, 
the Co1nmission \\Tas \vithout the legal powrer to do so 
under thP facts of this case. The broad jurisdictional 
powPr given to the Industrial Co1nmission under Section 
35-1-78 doe~ not giYe the Collunission an unli1nited or 
arbitrary po\vc~r to ignore all principles of res judicata 
and co1n1nence to re-litigate elai1ns, sueh as Claim 1~1 
140-99, \\Thich have once been heard, settled, and closed. 
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.. 
{)n thP contrary, la\\· determined by this Court has 
<·ont'inPd the Cotnnti~~ion's power thereunder to cases 
whPrP thPrP i~ a sho\\·ing of some change or new develop-
tnPnt whir.h <'nuld not have been anticipated by the 
Conuni:-;~ion at the first hearing of the claim and \vhich 
1:-; not <'HU~Pd hy subsequent independent events . 
. Act na J.~ife Ins. Co., et al. v. Industrial Commission 
of l ,·tah, ef al., 73 l Ttah 366, 274 P. 139 (192.9), explained 
the litnits put upon the statute at p. 145: 
H'"fhP Utah Statute does not expressly state 
that good cause must be shown after an award 
is once 1nade to authorize jurisdiction by the 
Conunission as does the California statute, but 
\VP are of the opinion, as held in the case of 
~alt Lake v. Industrial Comn1ission, supra, that 
good cause must be shown, especially if the pre-
vious a\vard purports to be final.'' 
~._',' alt Lake ( \ ify r. Industrial Comrnission, 61 Utah 
51-l, :2L-) P. 10·±'7 (1923), explains the "good cause" 
rPfPrred to in the .. Jrt ua case at p. 1048: 
HIt certainly \vas not intended by that section 
that the Commission might resume jurisdiction 
of a case that had been once regularly determined 
\\·ithout son1e change or ne\v development in the 
injury complained of not known to the parties 
\vhen the former award was made. 
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" . . . . The Court is of the opinion that the 
foregoing is a reasonable and logical interpreta-
tion of . . . (the Section), and that any other in-
terpretation would invite endless litigation in this 
class of cases." 
Continental Casualty Co., et al. v. industrial Com-
mission of Utah et al., 70 Utah 354, 260 P. 279 (1927) 
explains at p. 283 that : 
"There must be a changed condition or a 
development of some kind to justify a modifi-
cation of the previous award either in favor of 
or against the applicant." 
The requirements, thus set out, were restated in 
Carter v. Industrial Commission, 76 l"Ttah 520, 290 P. 
776 (1930) by referring to Brklacic v. Industrial Com-
mission, 63 Utah 582, 227 P. 1036 and numerous subse-
quent cases have restated and confirmed the rule. 
Even when the Commission finds cause for assum-
ing its continuing jurisdiction, Johnson v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 93 lTtah 493, 73 P. 2d 1308 (1937) 
at p. 1309 thus restricts the scope of the matters consid-
ered: 
"Notwithstanding the continuing jurisdiction 
of the Co1nmission over the case, the aw·ard as 
1nade "~as a final adjudication as to the matters 
therein decided including the issue as to the 
plaintiff's condition then existing." 
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It i~ PvidPnt upon the record in the instant case 
that Cluin1 X o. 1~1 140-99 determined that the applicant's 
injury nH of .Jan nary :2H, 1.961, amounted to a "permanent 
,}isahility ol' ;>/~" (1{-53). lt is further evident that 
linhi lity for ~aid disability \Yas paid to and accepted by 
thP appli<'nnt, thu~ rlo~ing that claim (R-49). 
'ro reopen that clai1n, the applicant \Yas obligated to 
proYP ~otne <'hnng't' or nP\Y develop1nent in his case 
\rhieh ,,·a~ not kno\Yn hy the Commission on January 30, 
l~)fil, \rh~n itH Order \ras 1nade. The hearing on Novem-
IH'r 1:~. l~)fi:~ n~ither \\"as sought h~" the applicant for such 
purpo~P nor, a~ "~in be Hhown by argument under Point 
1 II, \Va~ any ehange or nP\Y development, referable to the 
1 !l.~)S arridPnt. proven. 
POINT II 
THE I~DUSTRIAL COlVIMISSION HAD NO JURISDIC-
TIO~ 0\"ER THE PLAINTIFFS UNDER THE CLAIM 
~lADE BY THE APPLICANT. 
HaYing determined that the new and independent 
Claitn Xo. ()06-t. not Clain1 Xo. I~[ 140-99, \Yas under con-
~id~ration at the hearin2: on X ovember 13 1963 it is 
LJ ' ' 
oln·ion~ that thP Conuui~sion could not have jurisdiction 
nYt~r the ... \.ppellants. The doctrine of res judicata under 
l.~tah la\Y bar~ the subsequent filing of a new claim based 
t'll a previous litigated and concluded claim in \\r orkmen's 
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Compensation cases as 'vell as any other type of legal 
action. 
In Spencer v. Industrial Commission of Utah, et al., 
4 lTtah 2d 185, 290 P. 2d 692 (1955), this Court explained 
the doctrine of res judicata as applied to Workmen's 
Compensation cases. After discussing the llffect of Sec-
tion 35-1-78 (continuing jurisdiction) on the doctrine, this 
Court said at p. 694: 
"It is not to be assumed from the above that 
an applicant may reapply to the Commission for 
a new determination upon the same facts merely 
because he may be dissatisfied with its former 
order, any more than it means that the defendant 
in such a proceeding could do so. The act provides 
that a party aggrieved by the action of the Com-
mission may apply for a rehearing or seek a 
revie"T in this Court "'"ithin the time prescribed 
by la,v. This is the exclusive means of securing 
a review of determination made on any given 
state of facts. If this is not done, it is inconceive-
able that the Legislature intended, or that the law 
should be, that the party could file a new appli-
cation and have the Commission redeter1nine his 
case on identical facts.'' 
The general rule as to res judicata as applied to 
'Vorkmen's Co1npensation cases is set out in 99 C.J.S. 
200, 204 (Workmen's Co1npensation, Sections 853 and 
854): 
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··Except as provided othPr\\"ise by statute, 
u final a\\·ard or judgment in a co1npensation 
<·asP is like a final judgn1Pnt in any other case, 
nnd, subjPet to the right of appeal, is conclusive 
as to all matters "yhich Inay be adjudicable, and 
all issues before the tribunal at the time of the 
Pntry of its decision ... 
''Statutes authorizing review or modification 
of an a\\·ard or judgment or a change of condition, 
the reorcurence of incapacity, or its aggravation, 
increase, dilninution or termination do not affect 
the conclusiveness of the award or judgment in 
question as to matters of law or fact residing in 
the adjudication. In proceedings brought under 
such statutes the original or prior award or judg-
Inent is conclusive of all questions determined 
""hether of la\v or of fact, or which might have 
hPen presented and determined ... " 
The applicanf~ only rernedy as to Plaintiffs was, 
therefore, an application for n1odification of the Order 
PntPred in Claim K o. Il\I 140-99. 
POINT III 
THE ORDER OF THE COl\Il\iiSSION IS UNLAWFUL 
BECAl~SE ITS FINDINGS ARE ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS 
AXD COXTRARY TO THE lJXCONTRADICTED EVIDENCE. 
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The applicant may not recover frou1 the Plaintiffs 
unless there is some evidence that the 1958 aceident, 
uninterrupted by an independent intervening cause, 
produced his present condition. The co1nvensability of an 
aggravation or "lighting up" of a prior disease or in-
firmity caused hy an industrial accident is established 
hy a long line of cases decided hy this Court. See 
ll1akoff Compa11y v. Industrial Co111rnission, 13 lTtah 2d 
23, 368 P. 2d 70 (1962). 
In Spencer v. Industrial Commission, et al., 87 l~tah 
336, 40 P. 2 188 ( 1935), this Court explained the reason 
for the rule at page 197 : 
" A claim for compensation may not be denied 
because a new injury 'lighted up, reopened or 
revived an existing infirmity of the injured em-
ployee.' X o standai·d of health or physical fitness 
for an employment is prescribed by our statute 
to entitle an e1nployee to con1pensation for an 
injury arising by accident out of or in the course 
of his employment. Apparently, \vhen one enters 
an employment, the Pnlployer takes the employee 
as he is." 
The criteria set up in these case8 for deter1nining 
the aggravation is \\yhether the e1nployee'~ ability to 
verfor1n the saute ty1 )e of \York has been reduced by the 
accident. In T,intic illilring Co., et a!. v. Industrial Co·m-
Jnissi.on of Utah, et al., 60 {Ttah 14, 206 P. 278, 23 A.L.R. 
325 ( 1922), this Court pointed out the change in the 
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Ptnploype's eapaeity to eontinue his regular employment 
and statPd at page 279: 
"If the plaintiff's contention is true, that the 
injury of \vhich Snyder complains is but a con-
tinuation of a disease previously existing, un-
aggravated or unaccelerated by any fortuitous 
pv·ent \\Thieh rnay he denominated an accident, 
then, in Yi ew of the statute quoted, the injury is 
not compensable and the award made by the 
Co11unission should be vacated, annulled and set 
aside. On the other hand, if the findings of the 
Conunission are true, that ... (the accident) ... 
\ras either the direct cause of the tuberculosis or 
lighted up a dormant condition which existed 
previously, but which had not incapacitated him 
for performing his duties as an employee, then 
thP award made by the Cornmission should not 
be disturbed .... '' 
.A.ll Pvidence in the instant case conclusively shows that 
the applicant's disability "Tas immediately increased by 
both U1P Iverson and Wasatch accidents. After the 
~lollerup accident, his back didn't give him ... "any 
trouble to speak of ... " and as he states ... ''I was able 
to do anything I \vanted to." (R-36) He continued his 
~rune \\'"ork for ~lollerup into 1959 (R-108) at which ti1ne 
h~ aeeeptPd other equally strenuous work at Kennecott 
(R-10S), Flruning Gorge Darn (R-110) and l\tiick Iverson's 
~Prviee station (R-110, 111). But the accident at Iverson's 
ean~ed an inunediate change in "~orking capacity: 
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"Q. Would you say that you have had trouble 
off and on ever since that time~ 
"A. Yes. A little. But it hasn't been anything 
serious, or anything to bother me much, 
until after the l\Iick Iverson deal." (R-24) 
and resulted in forcing the applicant to SPP doctors and 
subsequently take lighter work: 
"Q. Now from that time on, the Iverson incident, 
what was your ability to work~ Were you 
able to do most anything J? 
"A. No. That's the reason I took that service 
station. Was to try to get off where it was 
easy. Where I could take my o'vn - Well, 
didn't have to hit the ball, like you do on the 
job. 
'~Q. So following the Iverson injury you took 
'vhat you thought would be lighter work, by 
running your o'vn servire station ; is that 
correct~ 
'~A. y e~. 
"Q. Did you receive any treat1nent follo,ving 
the Iverson injury? 
4' A. Oh, yes. That is "Then I went to the chiro-
practor up in the avenues here ... I went to 
him as long as the insurance fund would let 
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mP, and then I visited doctors - Dr. Argyle, 
and Dr. 1 1~Van~, and Dr. Clegg, and Dr. Ed-
dington, all of thP rest of them - since, 
trying to get relief." (R-25,) 
Th .. r~eord al~o shows a marked change in the 
applica.nf~ eondition following the Wasatch accident. 
He inunediately contacted a doctor for pain pills (R-17) 
and \Va~ allo\\·~d to \vork "in a slow, easy manner" 
( R-4-1) until November 28, 1962, since which time he has 
hPen nnabl~ to \\·ork at all (R-43, 45). 
rrhe tnedical PVidence COmpels a finding that the 
I vPrson and \Yasatch accidents aggravated the appli-
cant'~ prior condition. The testimony of Dr. Boyd Hol-
brook upon ero~~-exa1nination established: 
(a) That the applicant suffered from a back 
condition prior to 1958 which was progressive 
and degerative in nature (R-103), 
(b) That each of the three accidents caused a 
\\·ors~ning of that condition (R-105), and 
(e) That 1nedically it is difficult to say 
"·hich of the accidents had the greatest adverse 
effect (R-106). 
These conclusions stand uncontradicted by other medical 
evidence and, as this Court held in Oberg v. SOJYIAders et 
al .. 111 Ctah 507. 184 P. 2d 229, (1947) on page 235, 
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"the testin1ony of a \Yitness is no stronger than \\rhere 
it is left on cross-examination." No evidence, medical 
or otherwise, \\ras presented to establish a casual re-
lationship between the 1958 l\f ollerup accident and the 
applicant'~ present condition. 
The Commission seemingly based its Order upon 
the conclusion stated in the l\fedical Panel report of July 
7, 1963. Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., 1953, makes it the duty 
of the Commission to refer the "medical aspects of the 
case" to the Medical Panel which is to make an examin-
ation of the injured and report it findings. The duty of 
the Co1nmission is then to consider the medical evidence 
obtained from the Panel together "rith all other evidence 
presented to it in arriving at a finding which \Vill, und(-'f 
the law, support an Order. The statute does not permit 
the Medical Panel to assunH~ the Commission's duty of 
determining the liability of the parties according to the 
law. 
The Commission's Order was based upon mere 
conjecture. It \\Tas arbitrary, capricious~ and not based 
upon evidence. This Court held in Continental Casualty 
Co., et rd. v. Industrial Connnission of Utah, 75 Utah 
220, 284 P. 313 (19:29) at page 314 that: 
"An a\vard cannot rest upon 1nere conjecture or 
possibility." 
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In .1/akoff ( 1oJJI})(IJI,IJ v. Industrial Commission of 
l~tah. cl a/., S'Upra. Ri<·hard Howell suffered from a back 
c·otulition dating l'ro1n an accident in 1955. In 1957, Mr. 
llnwPll slipped on stairs \vhi le en1ployed by Makoff's, 
('rtttsing- an aggravation of the prior condition. In 1960, 
hP ngain injured his back \\~hile putting on his trousers. 
Thi~ Con rt nffirinPd 1\1 r. 1-1 o"rell's award against Makoff 
nndPr the aggravation rule and pointed out that it was 
inllnatPrial \vho his e1nployer was in 1955, as this would 
not altPr ~lakofl'·s liability for the aggravation. The 
appellants here ~Pek a consistent ruling. 
CON·OLUSION 
The Conunission never intended that its hearing on 
thi~ ea~t· inYolvP thP prior claiin made by the applicant 
ag-ainst LihPrty ~lutual in 1960. That claim was deter-
ntined and closed and no change or new development 
\\·a~ ~ho\vn to require the granting of further compensa-
tion therPunder. 
To hring the Plaintiffs into a ne\v action filed 
again~t another e1nployer years later is directly against 
the do('trine of res judicata and the provisions of the 
\Y orlanen ·s Co1npensation Act providing for a modifica-
tion of prior Order~. 
If the Connuission·s Order be upheld, in this case, 
the a~gravation rule "rill be denied its application and 
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the employer who chanced to be involved in the first 
of a series of aggravations of a degenerative condition, 
will be burdened with a responsibility which should right-
fully be shared by all employers in proportion to the 
increase in disability caused by their accidents. Such 
an Order cannot be permitted to stand. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN H. SNOW and 
SKEEN, WORSLEY, SNOW & 
CHRISTENS·EN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
701 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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